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SYMPOSIUM
THE GOALS OF ANTITRUST
FOREWORD:
ANTITRUST’S PURSUIT OF PURPOSE
Barak Orbach*
Consumer welfare is the stated goal of U.S. antitrust law. It was offered
to resolve contradictions and inconsistencies in antitrust. The Supreme
Court adopted it believing that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a
‘consumer welfare prescription.’” Alas, since the introduction of the
standard, antitrust has been searching for its purpose. This Foreword
introduces the debate on the goals of antitrust and briefly presents
perspectives in this debate.
In 1963, fifty years before the publication of this Symposium, Robert
Bork embarked a fifteen-year journey in antitrust. His journey opened with
a provocative essay in Fortune magazine that he wrote with his colleague at
Yale Law School, Ward Bowman: The Crisis in Antitrust.1 It ended in
1978 with the publication of his influential book The Antitrust Paradox.2
Bork’s journey in antitrust focused on actual and perceived contradictions
and inconsistencies in antitrust law. It was part of a broad intellectualideological movement that built a body of scholarship, expressing
confidence in markets and skepticism in the government.3 Bork’s antitrust
scholarship was exceptionally influential.4 The Supreme Court endorsed
some of his policy prescriptions. Most prominently, in 1979, in Reiter v.
Sonotone, relying in Bork’s academic work, the Supreme Court declared

* Professor of Law, the University of Arizona College of Law. www.orbach.org.
1. Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, FORTUNE, Dec.
1963, at 138, reprinted in 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965).
2. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978).
3. For general characteristics of this movement, see Barak Orbach, What Is
Government Failure?, 31 YALE J. REG. ONLINE (forthcoming 2013), available at http://
www.orbach.org/publications/government-failure/.
For the interactions between this
movement and antitrust, see Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy
Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543 (2013).
4. See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg, Judge Bork, Consumer Welfare and Antitrust Law,
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 449 (2008); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic
Analysis: Two Case Studies of Consistency and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision
Making, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 217 (2010).
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that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare
prescription.’”5 Since then, “consumer welfare” has been serving as the
stated goal of U.S. competition laws.6
There is no debate that “consumer welfare” is the stated goal of antitrust
law, nor is there any disagreement that the Supreme Court’s adoption of the
consumer welfare standard was done with no discussion and was erroneous.
However, the introduction of the consumer welfare standard sparked a great
controversy over the meaning of the term in antitrust and the desirable goals
of antitrust. It is fair to state that the introduction of the standard placed
antitrust at war with itself. In effect, the consumer welfare standard
established an antitrust paradox of the kind Robert Bork sought to resolve.
Antitrust has been searching for its purpose since the introduction of the
consumer welfare standard.7 This pursuit of purpose has opportunity costs
that have inevitably burdened intellectual progress in antitrust. David
Hyman and William Kovacic vividly described conflicts surrounding
antitrust’s pursuit of purpose:
U.S. antitrust professors have their own version of the Marquess of
Queensberry Rules. The most important rule is that arguments about the
merits of any given case, dispute, or regulatory decision/action must be
faithful to the Gospel of Antitrust (i.e., the specific history, logic, and
objectives that justified the adoption of the U.S. competition laws in the
first place).
Of course, it complicates matters slightly that there are at least three
competing versions of the Gospel: the Chicago School, the post–Chicago
School, and the Market-Egalitarian School.8

Reflecting on his policy prescription for the goal of antitrust in 1967,
Robert Bork noted: “If I am correct, reform is needed, but it need not come
from Congress. Antitrust policy is determined . . . by the Supreme Court.”9
The works in this Symposium illustrate that a reform is indeed needed. By
defining the goal of antitrust with an ambiguous phrase, the Supreme Court
created a redundant pursuit of purpose that has been feeding debates in the
field. The Court, therefore, should consider the meaning of the goals of
antitrust laws.
In 1979, the Supreme Court adopted the consumer welfare standard with
no discussion. The Court has been referring to and applying this standard
5. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting BORK, supra note 2, at
66). For the events that led to the adoption of the “consumer welfare” standard, see Barak
Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV 2253 (2013).
6. See generally Barak Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox,
7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133 (2011).
7. See also Jonathan B. Baker, Economics and Politics: Perspectives on the Goals and
Future of Antitrust, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175, 2180 (2013) (“Our conversation about the
goals of antitrust is unusual when compared with the way legal scholars talk about other
fields.”); Eleanor M. Fox, Against Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2157 (2013).
8. David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Institutional Design, Agency Life Cycle,
and the Goals of Competition Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2163, 2163 (2013).
9. Robert H. Bork, The Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 242, 242 (1967).
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ever since although it has never considered its (lack of) meaning or
soundness. The Court may keep doing so for a few more decades. Such a
path, however, takes the logic out of antitrust law, leaving “bad economics
and worse jurisprudence.”10 The Symposium in this issue of the Fordham
Law Review offers a collection of perspectives on the goals of antitrust
laws, written by a diverse group of antitrust scholars. Our works present
the controversy and refer to other key works in this debate.
Most of the works in this Symposium expressly criticize the
unproductive nature of the debate over the goals of antitrust, stressing the
need for clarity. For example Eleanor Fox dedicated her provocative essay,
Against Goals, to this point, arguing that the goals controversy “has
obscured the real debate, which is about how to achieve robust markets.”11
Herbert Hovenkamp observed that “[t]he volume and complexity of the
academic debate . . . creates an impression of policy significance that is
completely belied by the case law, and largely by government enforcement
policy. Few if any decisions have turned on the difference” between the
competing approaches.”12 The debate consists of a large number of
perspectives, some of them conflict and others complement each other.
(a) The Borkean Perspective. Robert Bork sparked the controversy by
arguing that the goal of antitrust ought to be “allocative efficiency,” which
he equated with the phrase “consumer welfare.” Further, Bork believed that
the word “competition” was confusing, because the word is mostly “a
shorthand expression for consumer welfare.”13 In this Symposium, Herbert
Hovenkamp argues that the “dominant view of antitrust policy . . . is that
. . . antitrust promotes allocative efficiency.”14 Alan Meese presents the
theoretical foundations of the debate, arguing that the competing welfare
standards are inherently flawed and making the case for efficiency as the
goal of antitrust.15
(b) The Original Intent Perspective. The stated goal of antitrust is
“consumer welfare” because, in 1979, the Supreme Court casually stated
that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare
prescription.’”16 One layer of the goal controversy is influenced by another
controversy—the role “originalism” should play in statutory interpretation.
Robert Bork was a vocal advocate of originalism. While the Supreme
Court endorsed his findings regarding the original intent of the Sherman
10. Id.
11. Fox, supra note 7, at 2161.
12. Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2471, 2474 (2013).
13. BORK, supra note 2, at 61. For discussion of Bork’s thesis, see Orbach, supra note
6; Orbach, supra note 5.
14. Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 2471.
15. Alan J. Meese, Reframing the (False?) Choice Between Purchaser Welfare and
Total Welfare, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2197 (2013).
16. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting BORK, supra note 2, at
66). For the events that led to the adoption of the “consumer welfare” standard, see Orbach,
supra note 5, at 2268–75.

2154

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

Act, these findings have no support in the record. Thus, the debate over the
goals of antitrust has kept antitrust scholars studying the legislative history
of a statute enacted in 1890. In this Symposium, Dale Collins provides a
study of the rise of the nineteenth century trusts and their influence on
antitrust legislation.17 My Essay presents the state of economic thinking at
the end of the nineteenth century, and argues that, at the time, the meaning
of “no trusts and combinations” was “competition.”18
(c) The Consumer Welfare Perspective. In 1982, Robert Lande
introduced the most influential critique of Bork’s study of the legislative
intent of the Sherman Act.19 Lande argued that, by passing the Sherman
Act, Congress indeed intended to promote consumer welfare, not
“efficiency” as Bork proposed. Put simply, Lande argued that “consumer
welfare” means “consumer welfare,” rather than “efficiency.” In the three
decades that followed Lande and others have developed a meaning for
antitrust consumer welfare.20 In this Symposium, Robert Lane explains his
critique of efficiency and the rationale for his thesis that prescribes
“consumer choice” as the original and desirable goal of antitrust law.21
Commissioner Joshua Wright and Judge Douglas Ginsburg disagree.22
They argue that consumer welfare cannot serve as a goal of antitrust law,
even though we refer to the goal with the phrase “consumer welfare.”
(d) The Anti-Trust Perspective. The origins of U.S. competition laws lie
in efforts to address the rise of the nineteenth century trusts.23 Fears of
bigness have remained as shadows in antitrust.24 The sentiments of
protecting consumers and small businesses from large businesses have
evolved and transformed over time but have never vanished. John
Kirkwood’s Article provides a modern exposition for the goal of
“protecting consumers and small suppliers from anticompetitive conduct.”25
(e) The Consumer Surplus Perspective. The antitrust methodology
utilizes a framework of partial equilibrium that does not accommodate
This economic framework, however, can
welfare estimates.26
accommodate surplus analysis when data is available. The difference
17. Wayne D. Collins, Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2279 (2013).
18. Orbach, supra note 5.
19. Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982).
20. See, e.g., Robert Lande & Neil Averitt, Using the “Consumer Choice Approach to
Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175 (2007).
21. Robert H. Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust:
Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2349 (2013).
22. Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps
Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405 (2013).
23. See generally Collins, supra note 17; Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The
Antitrust Curse of Bigness, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (2012).
24. Orbach & Campbell, supra note 23.
25. John B. Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small
Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2469 (2013).
26. See generally Meese, supra note 15; Orbach, supra note 6.
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between surplus and welfare is significant. Surplus is merely the difference
between the two values: willingness to pay and price, or the price charged
customers and the seller’s cost. Welfare incorporates all effects of a
particular activity; it is the surplus plus the actual effects on well-being.27
One economic version of the “consumer welfare” standard equates the
phrase with “consumer surplus.” This approach effectively means that the
goal of antitrust is to protect low prices.
(f) The Total Surplus Perspective. Many antitrust scholars argue that the
focus on consumer surplus may prevent firms from gaining efficiencies, if
such efficiencies would result in price increases. They therefore argue that
the current goal of antitrust, “consumer welfare,” ought instead to be “total
surplus.”28 Under this standard, an action or conduct may be socially
desirable even if it results in a decrease in the consumer surplus because of
offsetting gains in the producer surplus. Roger Blair and Daniel Sokol
explain this approach and its significance.29 Herbert Hovenkamp compares
differences between the consumer surplus and the total surplus
perspectives.30
(g) Competition. My Essay in this Symposium shows that until the
introduction of the consumer welfare standard, “competition” was
understood to be the goal of antitrust law.31 Robert Bork argued that the
word competition was too vague and confusing to be used in antitrust
policy and generally served as “a shorthand expression for consumer
welfare.”32 His consumer welfare prescription replaced the goal of
competition to enhance clarity in antitrust. The goal controversy is the
outcome of this erroneous premise. I argue that competition should indeed
serve as the goal of U.S. competition laws, that is, antitrust.
(h) The Noneconomic Perspective. Robert Bork criticized antitrust for
the use of “bad economics.”33 Some of his critics rejected the notion that
economics exclusively governs antitrust. They pointed out that politics,
values, and ideology have always played a role in antitrust, and in fact
influenced Bork’s own analysis. The modern noneconomic perspective
consists of two threads that acknowledge the influence of political and
ideological forces on antitrust. They differ in their normative starting point.
One thread perceives such influence as desirable, while the other accepts it
as an inevitable reality. Several works in this Symposium present this
27. To illustrate the difference, consider the consumer choice to purchase cigarettes.
The surplus differs from the welfare because of health effects. This is true both for the
consumer welfare and the total surplus because of externalities. Similar analysis applies to
most products.
28. The classic exposition is Oliver E. Williamson, Economies As an Antitrust Defense:
The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
29. Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standards in U.S. and E.U. Antitrust
Enforcement, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2497 (2013).
30. Hovenkamp, supra note 12.
31. Orbach, supra note 5.
32. BORK, supra note 2, at 61. For discussion of Bork’s thesis, see Orbach, supra note 6;
Orbach, supra note 5.
33. Bork, supra note 9, at 242.
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perspective. Alan Meese frames the debate over economic standards and
observes that “[t]he choice between competing definitions of ‘consumer
welfare’ is ultimately a normative one; economic theory cannot make the
choice for us. At the same time, such theory can inform or frame the debate
in a way that might influence the normative outcome.”34 Maurice Stucke
rejects the idea that “[c]ourts and enforcers should . . . constrict competition
policy to narrow economic goals.”35 Rather, Stucke proposes that they
“must reincorporate competition law’s political, social, and moral
objectives.”36 Harry First and Spencer Waller provide an account of the
role of antitrust in a democratic society.37 Jonathan Baker expresses
unequivocal confidence in the “indispensable role of economics in shaping
and applying modern antitrust” and explained how political forces influence
antitrust policy.38 Finally, Commissioner Joshua Wright and Judge
Douglas Ginsburg provide a sharp critique of the use of noneconomic
criteria in antitrust analysis.39 They do not deny the influence of
noneconomic forces on antitrust but explain why noneconomic perspective
should not be actively used in antitrust analysis.
(i) The Institutional Perspective. While antitrust has been searching for
its purpose, antitrust agencies have been enforcing antitrust laws. Two
papers in this Symposium address the practical aspects of enforcement.
David Hyman and William Kovacic posit that reality is much more nuanced
than the academic debate and, in practice, competition agencies try to
promote many goals.40 Finally, Steven Salop offers a comprehensive
analytical framework for merger settlement that clarifies the most practical
aspect of today’s antitrust enforcement and illustrates the practicability of
the controversy over the goals.41

34. Meese, supra note 15, at 2199.
35. Maurice E. Stucke, Should Competition Policy Promote Happiness?, 81 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2575, 2645 (2013).
36. Id.
37. First & Waller, supra note 3.
38. Baker, supra note 7, at 2176.
39. Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 22.
40. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 8.
41. Steven C. Salop, Merger Settlement and Enforcement Policy for Optimal Deterrence
and Maximum Welfare, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2647 (2013).

